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Congruency effects in distracter interference tasks are often smaller after incongruent
trials than after congruent trials. However, the sources of such congruency sequence
effects (CSEs) are controversial. The conflict monitoring model of cognitive control links
CSEs to the detection and resolution of response conflict. In contrast, competing theories
attribute CSEs to attentional or affective processes that vary with previous-trial congruency
(incongruent vs. congruent). The present study sought to distinguish between conflict
monitoring and congruency-based accounts of CSEs. To this end, we determined whether
CSEs are driven by previous-trial reaction time (RT)—a putative measure of response
conflict—or by previous-trial congruency. In two experiments using a face-word Stroop
task (n = 49), we found that current-trial congruency effects did not vary with previous-trial
RT independent of previous-trial congruency. In contrast, current-trial congruency effects
were influenced by previous-trial congruency independent of previous-trial RT. These
findings appear more consistent with theories that attribute CSEs to non-conflict
processes whose recruitment varies with previous-trial congruency than with theories that
link CSEs to previous-trial response conflict.
Keywords: congruency sequence effects, conflict monitoring, reaction time, face-word Stroop, sequential
modulations
INTRODUCTION
First observed in a flanker task two decades ago (Gratton et al.,
1992), congruency sequence effects (CSEs) refer to smaller con-
gruency effects after incongruent trials than after congruent tri-
als in distracter interference tasks. Since that time, CSEs, also
called Gratton effects or conflict adaptation (Botvinick et al.,
2001), have been observed in the flanker task (Ullsperger et al.,
2005), the Simon task (Wühr, 2005), and Stroop and Stroop-
like tasks (Kerns et al., 2004; Notebaert and Verguts, 2007; Egner
et al., 2010). While early observations of CSEs may have been
driven by confounds between congruency sequence and stim-
ulus or response repetition (Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al.,
2004), recent studies have documented CSEs while rigorously
controlling for such confounds (Egner et al., 2010; Akçay and
Hazeltine, 2011; Compton et al., 2012); (for a review, see Egner,
2008). Nonetheless, the psychological mechanisms underlying
CSEs remain controversial.
The conflict monitoring model posits that CSEs stem from
variations of previous-trial response conflict (i.e., the simultane-
ous activation of competing responses) (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Yeung et al., 2004). In particular, the model posits that heightened
response conflict in the previous trial triggers increased attention
to task-relevant stimuli and responses in the current trial. The
model also posits that reaction time (RT) is a more direct index of
response conflict than congruency because “conflict more closely
tracks RT than congruence condition when the two are disso-
ciated” (Yeung et al., 2011, p. 3). Further, although the model
acknowledges the existence of processes other than response con-
flict (e.g., attention, response preparation, etc.), it appears to hold
that such processes affect RT only through their influence on
response conflict. As explained by Yeung et al. (2011).
“. . . slow congruent trials are not slow despite having low conflict,
and fast incongruent trials are not fast despite having high conflict.
To the contrary, slow congruent trials are slow precisely because
conflict is high—a consequence of failing to focus attention,
misperceiving the distracter, or preparing the wrong response,
etc.—while fast incongruent trials are fast because conflict is low
(Yeung et al., 2011, p. 3–4).”
Given that variations of RT are mediated solely through varia-
tions of response conflict, the model posits that incongruent and
congruent trials with equivalent RTs are associated with equiva-
lent response conflict and that, within any particular trial type,
slow-RT trials are associated with greater response conflict than
fast-RT trials (Yeung et al., 2011). In short, the model posits that
CSEs are driven by response conflict, which is directly indexed by
trial-specific RT.
In contrast, competing theories posit that CSEs are driven
by attentional or affective processes that vary with previous-
trial congruency. For example, participants may develop expec-
tations about current-trial congruency based on previous-trial
congruency and, consequently, allocate more or less attention
to the current-trial distracter (Gratton et al., 1992). Participants
may also experience congruency switch costs while alternating
between processes that underlie the processing of incongru-
ent and congruent stimuli; these switch costs then manifest as
CSEs (Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011). Finally, participants may
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experience greater negative affect when presented with incon-
gruent stimuli relative congruent stimuli, triggering increased
attention to task-relevant stimuli and responses in the next
trial (van Steenbergen et al., 2010, 2012; Dreisbach and Fischer,
2011, 2012). Despite extensive study, the debate between con-
flict monitoring and congruency-based accounts of CSEs remains
unresolved.
The present study sought to resolve this controversy by capital-
izing on the fact that conflict monitoring and congruency-based
accounts of CSEs make distinct predictions about the influ-
ences of previous-trial RT and previous-trial congruency on
current-trial congruency effects. As described earlier, the conflict
monitoring model posits that RT is a direct index of response
conflict (Yeung et al., 2011). Coupled with the model’s asser-
tion that response conflict drives CSEs (Botvinick et al., 2001),
this assumption leads the model to predict that current-trial
congruency effects should be (a) equivalent after RT-matched
incongruent and congruent trials and (b) smaller after slow-
RT than after fast-RT trials within any particular trial type. Put
simply, the model predicts an influence of previous-trial RT on
current-trial congruency effects that is independent of previous-
trial congruency. In contrast, congruency-based accounts posit
that CSEs are driven by attentional or affective processes related
to previous-trial congruency. Thus, such accounts predict a rela-
tionship between previous-trial congruency and current-trial
congruency effects that is independent of previous-trial RT.
We investigated these competing predictions in two exper-
iments. To anticipate, we found that current-trial congruency
effects were not influenced by previous-trial RT independent
of previous-trial congruency but were influenced by previous-
trial congruency independent of previous-trial RT. These results
appear more consistent with the predictions of congruency-based





Twenty-three healthy adults (mean age: 20.4 years; age range:
18–29 years; 16 females) from the University of Michigan com-
munity participated in the experiment. All gave written informed
consent prior to participating in accordance with the University of
Michigan’s Institutional Review Board. Each individual was paid
$10 per h for his or her participation.
Stimuli
Face-word stimuli in the form of black and white photographs
from Egner et al. (2010) were provided by Tobias Egner. There
were 12 males and 12 females faces. We used Presentation
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, www.neurobs.com) on Dell
Vostro PCs running Windows XP to present the task stimuli and
to record participants’ responses.
Task and procedure
Participants completed 16 practice trials with auditory feedback
after each incorrect response. Next, they completed eight 64-trial
blocks of a face-word Stroop task adapted from a recent study
FIGURE 1 | A schematic of the experimental task. In each trial, subjects
were instructed to discriminate the gender of the face image (male or
female) while ignoring the gender of the superimposed word (male or
female). In this sample trial sequence, an incongruent stimulus in one trial
(left) is followed by a congruent stimulus in the subsequent trial (right).
(Egner et al., 2010). In each trial (Figure 1), participants viewed a
male or female face with a superimposed distracter word (“male”
or “female”) for 1000ms. Participants were instructed to iden-
tify the gender of the face as quickly as possible without making
mistakes while ignoring the gender of the word. In congruent tri-
als, the genders of the face and the word matched (e.g., a female
face presented with the word “female”). In incongruent trials, the
genders of the face and word were different (e.g., a female face
presented with the word “male”). Participants indicated the gen-
der of the face (male or female) using the “j” and “k” keys on a
standard keyboard, and the gender-response mapping was coun-
terbalanced across participants. A 1000ms interval was provided
for participants to respond.
A 2000ms stimulus onset asynchrony separated adjacent tri-
als. As in Egner et al. (2010), we did not allow exact repetitions
of the face or the word across consecutive trials. Specifically, no
face repeated in consecutive trials, and the word’s case (upper
or lower) alternated every trial. In all other respects, the stimu-
lus construction procedure for creating face-word pairings was
randomized.
Data analysis
Prior to analyzing the data from each participant, we removed
trials in which no response was made and trials with RTs greater
than three standard deviations from the condition-specific mean.
For analyses of the RT data, we also removed error trials and
trials immediately following errors. For analyses of the accuracy
data, error trials and trials immediately following errors were
retained.
To control for the effect of previous-trial RT on CSEs, we cre-
ated a subset of congruent and incongruent trials with equivalent
RTs for each participant (Carp et al., 2010). For each congruent
trial, we identified an incongruent trial whose RT fell within 5ms
of the congruent-trial RT. If multiple incongruent trials met this
criterion, then the incongruent trial with the RT closest to the
congruent-trial RT was chosen. Trials that could not be matched
across conditions were discarded from this analysis. After the RT-
matched data set was created, we determined whether current-
trial congruency effects differed after RT-matched congruent and
incongruent trials. Current congruent and current incongruent
trials were not limited to those in the RT-matched data set (i.e.,
they were drawn from the full data set).
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We also investigated the relationship between previous-trial
RT and current-trial congruency effects. To do so, we identified
the 33% slowest trials and the 33% fastest trials in each trial type
(incongruent and congruent). We then asked whether current-
trial congruency effects differed after the 33% slowest vs. the
33% fastest (a) incongruent trials and (b) congruent trials. As in
the RT-matching analysis above, current congruent and current
incongruent trials in the RT tertile analysis were not limited to
the 33% fastest and 33% slowest trials in each trial type (i.e., they
were drawn from the full data set).
RESULTS
Congruency sequence effects in the full data set
As in previous studies of the face-word Stroop task (Egner et al.,
2008, 2010), mean RT was longer in incongruent than in congru-
ent trials [528 vs. 514ms; t(22) = 3.66, p = 0.001]. Analogously,
mean accuracy was lower in incongruent than in congruent tri-
als [94.9 vs. 97.0%; t(22) = 3.64, p = 0.001]. Thus, effects of
congruency on RT did not stem from speed-accuracy tradeoffs.
Also consistent with previous studies, congruency effects on
both RT and response accuracy were reduced after incongruent
trials, relative to congruent trials. In the RT data, we observed
greater congruency effects after congruent than after incongru-
ent trials [28 vs. 9.2ms; t(22) = 3.82, p < 0.001; Figure 2, upper
left]. This CSE was driven by faster congruent-trial RT after con-
gruent than after incongruent trials [13.2ms; t(22) = 5.33, p <
0.001] and by a trend toward faster incongruent-trial RT after
incongruent than after congruent trials [5.3ms; t(22) = 1.39, n.s.].
In the accuracy data, congruency effects were also larger after
congruent than after incongruent trials [3.2% vs. 1.2%; t(22) =
2.47, p = 0.02; Figure 3, upper left]. This CSE was driven by
non-significantly greater congruent-trial accuracy after congru-
ent than after incongruent trials [0.76%; t(22) = 1.58, n.s.] and by
significantly greater incongruent-trial accuracy after incongruent
than after congruent trials [1.3%; t(22) = 2.04, p = 0.054].
Congruency effects after RT-matched congruent and incongruent
trials
Next, we investigated whether CSEs were smaller after RT-
matched congruent and incongruent trials than in the full data
set. An RT-matching procedure (see Methods) allowed us to select
congruent and incongruent trials that were naturally matched for
RT. On average, the RT-matching procedure removed 22.8% of
trials, leaving an average of 169.1 pairs of RT-matched congru-
ent and incongruent trials in each participant. As intended, mean
RT for incongruent and congruent trials did not differ in the RT-
matched data set [514 vs. 514ms; t(22) = 1.20, n.s.]. However,
mean accuracy remained lower in incongruent than in congruent
trials [95.0 vs. 97.4%; t(22) = 3.44, p = 0.002].
Contrary to the predictions of the conflict monitoring model,
but consistent with congruency-based accounts of CSEs, we
observed statistically indistinguishable CSEs before and after RT-
matching. For the RT data, CSEs did not differ between the
RT-matched and full data sets [20 vs. 18ms; t(22) = 0.51, n.s.]. As
in the full data set, the RT-matched data set yielded greater con-
gruency effects after congruent trials than after incongruent trials
[27 vs. 7.5ms; t(22) = 4.34, p < 0.001; Figure 2, upper right].
FIGURE 2 | Congruency sequence effects (CSEs) in the RT data. We
observed robust CSEs in the full data set [Experiment 1: t(22) = 3.82,
p < 0.001; Experiment 2: t(25) = 5.32, p < 0.001] and in the RT-matched
data set [Experiment 1: t(22) = 4.34, p < 0.001; Experiment 2: t(25) = 5.61,
p < 0.001]. CSEs did not differ across these data sets in Experiment 1
[t(22) = 0.51, n.s.], and were non-significantly larger in the RT-matched data
set than in the full data set in Experiment 2 [t(25) = 2.01, p = 0.055]. Error
bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
This CSE was driven by faster congruent-trial RT after congruent
than after incongruent trials [10.1ms; t(22) = 3.96, p < 0.001]
and by faster incongruent-trial RT after incongruent trials than
after congruent trials [9.5ms; t(22) = 2.24, p = 0.035]. For the
accuracy data, we also found equivalent CSEs in the RT-matched
full data sets [1.4 vs. 2.1%; t(22) = 1.23, n.s.]. In the RT-matched
data set, we observed a trend toward larger congruency effects
after congruent than after incongruent trials [2.7 vs. 1.3%; t(22) =
1.94, p = 0.065; Figure 3, upper right]. This trend toward a CSE
was driven by numerically greater congruent-trial accuracy after
congruent than after incongruent trials [0.76%; t(22) = 1.54, n.s.],
and by non-significantly greater incongruent-trial accuracy after
incongruent than after congruent trials [0.68%; t(22) = 1.01, n.s.].
Congruency effects after slow-RT vs. fast-RT trials
Finally, we investigated the relationship between previous-trial RT
and current-trial congruency effects. Specifically, we divided cor-
rect incongruent and correct congruent trials into RT tertiles (see
Methods) and determined the magnitude of current-trial congru-
ency effects following (a) the 33% slowest vs. 33% fastest incon-
gruent trials and (b) the 33% slowest vs. 33% fastest congruent
trials. As intended, mean RT was longer in slow-RT than fast-
RT incongruent trials [606 vs. 430ms; t(22) = 24.2, p < 0.001]
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FIGURE 3 | Congruency sequence effects (CSEs) in the accuracy data.
We observed significant CSEs in the full data set [Experiment 1:
t(22) = 2.47, p = 0.02; Experiment 2: t(25) = 2.91, p = 0.007] and in the
RT-matched data set [Experiment 1: t(22) = 1.94, p = 0.065; Experiment 2:
t(25) = 3.27, p = 0.003]. CSEs did not differ across data sets [Experiment 1:
t(22) = 1.23, n.s.; Experiment 2: t(25) = 0.38, n.s.]. Error bars indicate the
standard error of the mean.
and congruent trials [630 vs. 437ms; t(22) = 26.6, p < 0.001].
Critically, contrary to the predictions of the conflict monitoring
model, but consistent with congruency-based accounts of CSEs,
previous-trial RT tertile had no significant impact on current-trial
congruency effects. In the RT data, we observed equivalent con-
gruency effects after slow-RT vs. fast-RT incongruent trials [2.1
vs. 3.4ms; t(22) = 0.20, n.s.; Figure 4, upper left] and congruent
trials [33 vs. 21ms; t(22) = −1.8, n.s.; Figure 4, upper right]. In
the accuracy data, we also found comparable congruency effects
following slow-RT vs. fast-RT incongruent trials [1.9 vs. 0.64%;
t(22) = 0.91, n.s.; Figure 5, upper left] and congruent trials [3.9
vs. 3.8%; t(22) = 0.11, n.s.; Figure 5, upper right].
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, we evaluated the competing predictions of con-
flict monitoring and congruency-based accounts of CSEs. The
conflict monitoring model predicts an influence of previous-
trial RT on current-trial congruency effects that is indepen-
dent of previous-trial congruency. In contrast, congruency-based
accounts predict an influence of previous-trial congruency on
current-trial congruency effects that is independent of previous-
trial RT. Our findings appeared to support congruency-based
accounts, in which CSEs are driven by previous-trial congruency.
FIGURE 4 | The effects of previous-trial RT tertile on current-trial
congruency effects in the RT data. Congruency effects did not differ after
the 33% slowest vs. the 33% fastest incongruent trials [Experiment 1:
t(22) = 0.20, n.s.; Experiment 2: t(25) = 1.51, n.s.] or congruent trials
[Experiment 1: t(22) = −1.8, n.s.; Experiment 2: t(25) = 1.10, n.s.]. Error
bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
However, the design of Experiment 1 suffered from two lim-
itations. First, because the order of trial conditions was ran-
domized, confounds between congruency sequence and response
sequence could have contributed to CSEs in the full data set
(Egner, 2007). Second, given our random procedure for pair-
ing faces with words, some face-word pairings may have been
presented more often than others, and this effect may have dif-
fered between congruent and incongruent trials. Critically, any
such difference could have led to contingency biases that can
inflate estimates of CSEs (Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011). We




As in Experiment 1, participants were recruited using flyers
posted on the University of Michigan campus. Experiment 2
included 26 participants (17 females), with an average age of
19.4 years and an age range of 18–22 years. As in Experiment 1,
informed written consent was obtained from each participant,
and participants were paid $10 per h.
Stimuli
The face images and gender words were identical to those used in
Experiment 1.
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FIGURE 5 | The effects of previous-trial RT tertile on current-trial
congruency effects in the accuracy data. Congruency effects did not
differ after the 33% slowest vs. the 33% fastest incongruent trials
[Experiment 1: t(22) = 0.91, n.s.; Experiment 2: t(25) = 0.70, n.s.] or
congruent trials [Experiment 1: t(22) = 0.11, n.s.; Experiment 2: t(25) = 1.8,
n.s.]. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
Task and procedure
The task and procedure were identical in most respects to those
used in Experiment 1 with three exceptions. First, in each block,
the four possible combinations of face gender (male or female)
and word gender (male or female) were first-order counter-
balanced across trials. Thus, each possible face-word combina-
tion was preceded equally often by each of the four types of
face-word combinations. This constraint yielded equal frequen-
cies of occurrence for the four possible first-order congruency
sequences (i.e., congruent-congruent, incongruent-congruent,
congruent-incongruent, and incongruent-incongruent). It also
ensured that response repetitions and response alternations
occurred equally often in each of these congruency sequences.
Second, each of the 24 actors (12 males, 12 females) was paired
equally often with each gender word (“female” and “male”)
and each case (upper and lower). This constraint ensured that
each face-word pairing occurred equally often, thereby rul-
ing out contingency biases that can lead to spurious CSEs
(Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011). Third, participants com-
pleted 24 practice trials and eight blocks of 96 trials during the
experiment.
Data analysis
The data analysis was identical to that in Experiment 1.
RESULTS
Congruency sequence effects in the full data set
As in Experiment 1, mean RT was longer in incongruent than in
congruent trials [546 vs. 528ms; t(25) = 5.20, p < 0.001]. Mean
accuracy was lower in incongruent than in congruent [94.2 vs.
96.6%] trials [t(25) = 6.49, p < 0.001].
Also paralleling the results of Experiment 1, we observed
significant CSEs for both RT and accuracy. In the RT data,
congruency effects were larger after congruent than after incon-
gruent trials [28.8 vs. 7.6ms; t(25) = 5.32, p < 0.001; Figure 2,
lower left]. This CSE was driven by faster congruent-trial RT
after congruent than after incongruent trials [9.2ms; t(25) =
3.44, p = 0.002] and by faster incongruent-trial RT after incon-
gruent than after congruent trials [12ms; t(25) = 3.27, p =
0.003]. In the accuracy data, we also observed larger congru-
ency effects after congruent than after incongruent trials [3.7
vs. 1.2%; t(25) = 2.91, p = 0.007; Figure 3, lower left]. This CSE
was driven by a trend toward higher congruent-trial accuracy
after congruent than after incongruent trials [0.71%; t(25) =
1.54; n.s.] and by significantly higher incongruent-trial accuracy
after incongruent than after congruent trials [1.8%; t(25) = 3.17;
p = 0.004].
Congruency effects after RT-matched congruent and incongruent
trials
We next investigated whether CSEs after RT-matched congruent
and incongruent trials were smaller than CSEs in the full data
set. The RT-matching procedure removed 19.5% of trials on aver-
age, leaving an average of 263.0 pairs of RT-matched congruent
and incongruent trials for each participant. As intended, mean
RT for incongruent and congruent trials in the RT-matched data
set was equivalent [532 vs. 532ms; t(25) = 0.46, n.s.]. However,
as in Experiment 1, mean accuracy remained lower in incon-
gruent than in congruent trials [94.6 vs. 97.1%; t(25) = 5.55,
p < 0.001].
Contrary to the predictions of the conflict monitoring model,
but consistent with congruency-based accounts of CSEs, we
observed statistically indistinguishable CSEs before and after
RT-matching. For the RT data, CSEs did not differ across the
RT-matched and full data sets [24vs. 21ms; t(25) = 2.01, p =
0.055]. In the RT-matched data set, we observed larger con-
gruency effects after congruent trials than after incongruent
trials [33 vs. 9.3ms; t(25) = 5.61, p < 0.001; Figure 2, lower
right]. This CSE reflected faster congruent-trial RT after con-
gruent than after incongruent trials [6.5ms; t(25) = 2.77, p =
0.01], as well as faster incongruent-trial RT after incongru-
ent than after congruent trials [17ms; t(25) = 4.32, p < 0.001].
For the accuracy data, CSEs were also comparable in the RT-
matched and full data sets [2.7 vs. 2.5%; t(25) = 0.38, n.s.].
In the RT-matched data set, congruency effects were larger
after congruent than after incongruent trials [4.1 vs. 1.4%;
t(25) = 3.27, p = 0.003; Figure 3, lower right]. This CSE reflected
both a trend toward greater congruent-trial accuracy after con-
gruent than after incongruent trials [0.83%; t(25) = 1.77, p =
0.089] and significantly greater incongruent-trial accuracy after
incongruent than after congruent trials [1.8%; t(25) = 2.95,
p = 0.0067].
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Congruency effects after slow-RT vs. fast-RT trials
Finally, we investigated the relationship between previous-trial
RT and current-trial congruency effects by dividing correct
incongruent and correct congruent trials into RT tertiles (see
Methods). As intended, mean RT was longer in the 33% slow-
est trials than in the 33% fastest trials for both incongruent trials
[658 vs. 447ms; t(25) = 20.1, p < 0.001] and congruent trials
[630 vs. 439ms; t(25) = 19.4, p < 0.001]. Contrary to the con-
flict monitoring model, but consistent with congruency-based
accounts of CSEs, we observed no relationship between previous-
trial RT and current-trial congruency effects. In the RT data,
current-trial congruency effects did not differ after slow-RT vs.
fast-RT incongruent trials [5.6 vs. 12.2ms; t(25) = 1.51, n.s.;
Figure 4, lower left] or congruent trials [26 vs. 33ms; t(25) =
1.10, n.s.; Figure 4, lower right]. In the accuracy data, congru-
ency effects also did not differ after slow-RT vs. fast-RT incon-
gruent trials [0.95 vs. 1.6%; t(25) = 0.70, n.s.; Figure 5, lower
left] or congruent trials [2.6 vs. 4.7%; t(25) = 1.8, n.s.; Figure 5,
lower right].
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 replicated the key results of Experiment 1 and there-
fore provided stronger support for congruency-based accounts of
CSEs. First, we observed robust CSEs in the full data set, and these
effects remained significant in the RT-matched data set. Second,
current-trial congruency effects did not differ after slow-RT vs.
fast-RT incongruent trials or after slow-RT vs. fast-RT congru-
ent trials. Finally, Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that
CSEs in the full data set were due to confounds between con-
gruency sequence and response sequence (Hommel et al., 2004;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006) or contingency biases (Schmidt and De
Houwer, 2011).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study sought to distinguish between the conflict
monitoring model and congruency-based accounts of CSEs.
As predicted by congruency-based accounts, current-trial con-
gruency effects were influenced by previous-trial congruency
independent of previous-trial RT. However, inconsistent with
the conflict monitoring model, current-trial congruency effects
were not influenced by previous-trial RT—a putative index
of response conflict—independent of previous-trial congruency
(Yeung et al., 2011). These findings provide novel support for
congruency-based accounts of CSEs but pose a challenge to
the conflict monitoring model. They also bolster prior studies
suggesting that CSEs might not be driven by response conflict
(Verbruggen et al., 2006; Lamers and Roelofs, 2011; Compton
et al., 2012).
Our findings suggest that the conflict monitoring model suf-
fers from at least one of two potential limitations. First, if the
model’s assumption that RT serves as a direct index of response
conflict is correct (Yeung et al., 2011), then our finding that
current-trial congruency effects are not influenced by previous-
trial RT is inconsistent with the model’s claim that response
conflict drives CSEs. The second potential limitation is that
trial-specific RT may not directly index response conflict. If this
is the case, then the present results would not challenge the
view that CSEs are driven by previous-trial response conflict.
However, they would indicate a need to revise the model so
that RT and response conflict can be decoupled. Consistent with
the need for such a decoupling, prior findings from EEG indi-
cate that congruency effects are absent after correctly-performed
trials in which a competing response was activated (i.e., when
response conflict was likely) but present after correctly-performed
trials in which a competing response was not activated (i.e.,
when response conflict was unlikely), independent of RT vari-
ability within each of these “previous” trial types (Burle et al.,
2002).
One might argue that it is not a problem for the model if RT
does not directly (and solely) index response conflict. Indeed, RT
could also reflect a variety of non-conflict processes (e.g., atten-
tion, motivation, etc.). As described in the Introduction, however,
the model does not appear to permit variations of RT indepen-
dent of response conflict. Further, Yeung and colleagues (Yeung
et al., 2011) have invoked this feature of the model to explain
recent observations that RT-matched incongruent and congruent
trials elicit equivalent activation in the posterior medial frontal
cortex, a brain region that is thought to detect response con-
flict (Grinband et al., 2011). The link between response conflict
and RT therefore appears to be a central feature of the conflict
monitoring model. For this reason, even if RT-matched congru-
ent and incongruent trials were not perfectly matched for conflict
in the present face Stroop tasks (thereby explaining the pres-
ence of CSEs following RT-matched congruent and incongruent
trials), the model would still have difficulty explaining why con-
gruency effects were not smaller after slow-RT (high conflict)
trials than after fast-RT (low conflict) trials in each congruency
condition.
If CSEs are not driven by previous-trial response conflict (at
least as operationalized by the conflict monitoring model), then
which congruency-related processes might give rise to them?
The view that CSEs are driven by expectancies regarding the
congruency of the upcoming stimulus has received some sup-
port (Duthoo et al., 2013), but not in all studies (Alpay et al.,
2009; Jiménez and Méndez, 2012). Recent studies also sug-
gest that negative affect triggered by incongruent stimuli (van
Steenbergen et al., 2010, 2012; Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011, 2012)
and/or congruency switch costs stemming from the use of dis-
tinct processes on congruent and incongruent trials (Schmidt
and De Houwer, 2011) may give rise to CSEs. Finally, it is
possible that CSEs are driven by changes in a task’s repre-
sentation in working memory (Hazeltine et al., 2011). Future
research should continue to develop and evaluate these potential
sources of CSEs.
It is improbable for several reasons that the present findings
stem from confounds related to exact stimulus or response rep-
etitions (Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004). First, exact
repetitions of the target face and/or the distracter word were
not permitted in consecutive trials (Egner et al., 2010). Second,
in Experiment 2, the frequencies of response repetitions and
response alternations were equated across the four congruency
sequences (Egner et al., 2010). Third, although the frequencies of
response repetitions and response alternations could have differed
across the four congruency sequences in the RT-matched data set,
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CSEs in the RT-matched data set did not differ from those in the
full data set.
We acknowledge, however, that CSEs in the present tasks could
reflect categorical repetitions of the distracter word (e.g., male
-> MALE). Such repetitions differed in frequency across the
four congruency sequences and might therefore have influenced
the overall magnitude of CSEs. In theory, such an influence
could have been mediated solely through feature integration
processes or via an interaction between such processes and
conflict-triggered control processes (Blais and Verguts, 2012).
However, since this potential influence on CSEs was similar in
the full data set, the RT-matched data set, and following slow-
RT vs. fast-RT trials, it is unclear how it could have completely
obscured an influence of previous-trial RT on current-trial con-
gruency effects. Nevertheless, future studies will be required to
determine the extent to which the present results generalize across
such low-level task parameters, as well as across different dis-
tracter interference tasks. Indeed, Egner (2007) argued that CSEs
reflect different mechanisms in different tasks (e.g., the Stroop,
Simon, and Eriksen tasks). Thus, as when studying any aspect of
CSEs, it is important to determine whether the results from one
task generalize to others.
In sum, the present findings challenge the conflict monitor-
ing model’s account of CSE while offering novel support for
congruency-based accounts. However, they are agnostic with
regard to the specific congruency-related processes that drive
CSEs. Future studies should therefore continue to investigate
the psychological mechanisms underlying this phenomenon.
Moreover, future modeling investigations should either revise the
conflict monitoring model to account for the present results or
develop new computational models of strategic adaptation in
distracter interference tasks.
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